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Abstract
ArbitraNon	  is	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  construcNon	  dispute	  resoluNon	  techniques	  in	  PalesNne.	  This
arNcle	  criNcally	  examines	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  arbitraNon	  and	  explains	  the	  recent
evoluNon	   of	   construcNon	   arbitraNon	   in	   PalesNne.	   This	   research	   depends	   on	   12	   semi-­‐
structured	  interviews	  with	   senior	   arbitrators.	   It	   also	   draws	   on	   a	   thorough	   examinaNon	   of
relevant	   documents	   such	   as	   legal	   instruments,	   court	   cases,	   legislaNon,	   and	   arbitraNon
clauses	  in	  standard	  forms	  of	  construcNon	  contracts.	  The	  study	  idenNﬁes	  the	  condiNons	  that
assisted	   the	   recent	   growth	   in	   the	  use	  of	   construcNon	   arbitraNon,	   such	  as	   the	  overhaul	  of
legal	   infrastructure	   in	   the	   form	  of	  modern	   legislaNon	  governing	  arbitraNon	  procedure	  and
court	   proceedings,	   the	   provision	   of	   contractual	   infrastructure	   in	   the	   form	   of	   widespread
incorporaNon	   of	   arbitraNon	   clauses	   in	   construcNon	   contracts,	   the	   establishment	   of
insNtuNonal	   infrastructure	   in	   the	   form	   of	   arbitraNon	   insNtuNons,	   and	   the	   build-­‐up	   of
qualiﬁed	   construcNon	   arbitrators.	   The	   study	   also	   uncovers	   the	   barriers	   that	   preclude
construcNon	   arbitraNon	   from	   reaching	   its	   next	   level	   and	   thriving,	   such	   as	   lengthy	   court
enforcement	  proceedings,	  the	  reluctance	  of	  some	  internaNonal	  organisaNons	  to	  parNcipate
in	  arbitraNon	  seated	  in	  PalesNne,	  and	  the	  relaNvely	  high	  arbitraNon	  costs.
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Introduction
The	  construcNon	  industry	  is	  a	  signiﬁcant	  contributor	  to	  the	  PalesNnian	  economy	  and	  a	  major
employer	   of	   the	   workforce	   (PCBS,	   2016).	   In	   accordance	   with	   empirical	   evidence,
quesNonnaire	   surveys	   soliciNng	   impressionisNc	   accounts	   of	   construcNon	   contractors,
construcNon	  disputes	  have	  been	  on	  the	  rise	  in	  recent	  years	  (Abu	  Rass,	  2006).	  The	  available
mechanisms	   to	   resolve	   construcNon	   disputes	   are	   negoNaNon,	   expert	   evaluaNon,
mediaNon/conciliaNon,	   adjudicaNon,	   arbitraNon	   and	   liNgaNon.	   Court	   liNgaNon	   is	   rarely
sought,	  adjudicaNon	  is	  widely	  unrecognised	  and	  rarely	  pracNced,	  and	  mediaNon	  is	  sNll	  in	  its
infancy.	   ArbitraNon	   is	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   dispute	   resoluNon	   techniques	   in	   the	   PalesNnian
construcNon	  industry	  (Besaiso	  et	  al.,	  2016).
Nonetheless,	  arbitraNon	  has	  received	  scant	  a]enNon	  in	  the	  extant	  literature.	  	  The	  majority
of	   literature	   concerned	   with	   construcNon	   arbitraNon	   focuses	   upon	   the	   market	   share	   of
arbitraNon	   and	  other	   dispute	   resoluNon	   techniques	  (Tuﬀaha,	   2015,	   Saqfelhait,	   2012,	   Eed,
2012,	   Abu	   Rass,	   2006)	   .	   These	   studies	   ﬁnd	   that	   arbitraNon	   is	   the	   fundamental	   dispute
resoluNon	  technique	   in	  case	  disputants	   fail	   to	   reach	  an	  amicable	  se]lement.	  Besides,	  Abu
Jbara	   (2012)	   used	   a	   quesNonnaire	   survey	   to	   examine	   the	   parNes'	   saNsfacNon	   with	   the
arbitraNon	   administered	   by	   the	   Engineering	   ArbitraNon	   Centre.	   She	   found	   that	   the
disputants	   are	   dissaNsﬁed	   with	   the	   costs	   and	   Nme	   of	   arbitraNon,	   the	   procedure	   of
determining	  arbitraNon	  fees,	  and	  the	  mechanism	  followed	  to	  form	  arbitral	  tribunals.
While	  it	  is	  desirable	  to	  understand	  the	  parNes’	  dispute	  resoluNon	  preferences	  and	  their	  level
of	  saNsfacNon,	  these	  quanNtaNve	  studies	   leave	  many	  quesNons	  unanswered.	  As	  a	  result	  of
this	   neglect,	   there	   is	   li]le	   understanding	   of	   how	   construcNon	   arbitraNon	   has	   grown	   in
prominence	   in	   PalesNne	   in	   recent	   years.	   Further,	   there	   is	   li]le	   known	   as	   to	   the	   factors
promoNng	  arbitraNon	  and	  the	  factors	  repressing	  it	  from	  moving	  forward.
Therefore,	  this	  qualitaNve	  research	  aims	  to	  look	  beyond	  simple	  saNsfacNon	  and	  preference
surveys	   and	   to	   contribute	   to	   our	   empirical	   understanding	   of	   the	   pracNce	   of	   construcNon
arbitraNon	  at	  the	  grassroots	  level.	  It	  also	  aims	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  past	  to	  explain	  the	  recent
Therefore,	  this	  qualitaNve	  research	  aims	  to	  look	  beyond	  simple	  saNsfacNon	  and	  preference
surveys	   and	   to	   contribute	   to	   our	   empirical	   understanding	   of	   the	   pracNce	   of	   construcNon
arbitraNon	  at	  the	  grassroots	  level.	  It	  also	  aims	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  past	  to	  explain	  the	  recent
rise	  of	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  and	  the	  modern-­‐day	  challenges	  facing	  its	  growth.
Methodology
This	   research	   is	   qualitaNve	   in	   nature.	   It	   uses	   descripNve	   (what)	   quesNons	   and	   analyNcal
(why)	  quesNons.	  To	  do	  so,	   it	  uses	  a	  mulN-­‐method	  research	  design.	  This	   involves	  the	  use	  of
more	  than	  one	  method	  of	  data	  collecNon	  as	  follows.
First,	  the	  researchers	  undertook	  a	  literature	  review	  covering	  journal	  arNcles	  and	  conference
papers.	   Second,	   the	   researchers	   conducted	   12	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	  with	   arbitrators
from	  Gaza	  and	  the	  West	  Bank. They	  are	  nine	  construcNon	  professionals,	   two	   lawyers,	  and
one	  reNred	  judge. The	  selecNon	  of	  those	  arbitrators	  involved	  purposive	  sampling	  in	  order	  to
access	   their	   rich	   knowledge	   and	   experience	   of	   the	   real-­‐world	   pracNce	   of	   construcNon
arbitraNon.	   The	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   via	   Skype	   and	   then	   transcribed. The	   average
duraNon	   of	   each	   interview	   was	   30	   minutes.	   The	   analysis	   of	   the	   transcript	   was	   done
manually.	  The	  interviews	  were	  semi-­‐structured,	  and	  hence	  some	  quesNons	  emerged	  during
the	   conversaNon.	   The	   parNcipants	   were	   informed	   that	   the	   answers	   and	   informaNon
provided	   would	   be	   used	   for	   academic	   research	   and	   publicaNon.	   Nonetheless,	   they	   were
assured	   that	   the	   conﬁdenNality	   of	   informaNon	   and	   anonymity	   of	   interviewees	   and
organisaNons	   would	   be	   preserved.	   Third,	   the	   researchers	   accessed	   legislaNon	   and	   court
cases available	   online	   on	   Al-­‐Muqtaﬁ	   to	   corroborate,	   support	   and	   elaborate	   on	   the
interviewees'	   statements	   or	   references	   to	   such	   legislaNon.	   The	   researchers	   searched	   for
available	  court	  cases	  relevant	  to	  construcNon	  liNgaNon	  or	  arbitraNon	  awards	  conﬁrmaNon	  or
challenge.	  Al-­‐Muqtaﬁ	  is	  the	  ﬁrst	  and	  leading	  online	  legal	  research	  database	  providing	  access
to	  legislaNon	  and	  courts'	  judgments	  in	  PalesNne.	  Fourth,	  the	  researchers	  examined	  relevant
documents	  (e.g.	  arbitraNon	  clauses	  in	  standard	  forms	  of	  contract,	  Al-­‐Majjallah)	  that	  provide
great	  assistance	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  whole	  picture.
Literature	  Review
Historical	  Overview	  of	  the	  Development	  of	  Arbitra&on	  in	  ancient	  Pales&ne	  (before	  20th
century)
ArbitraNon	  philosophy,	  as	  a	  dispute	  resoluNon	  method,	  is	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  Arab	  culture.
The	   noNon	   of	   deferring	   any	   dispute	   (commercial,	   family,	   poliNcal	   etc.)	   to	   a	   neutral	   third
party	   for	   a	   soluNon	  or	   decision	   is	  well-­‐established	   in	  Arab	   customs	   and	   tradiNons.	   	   So,	   if
parNes	   failed	   to	   se]le	   their	   disputes	   by	   negoNaNon,	   they	   used	   to	   appoint	   an	   arbitrator
‘Hakam’	   (Fakih,	   2011,	  Ahdab	  et	   al.,	   1998).	   The	  qualiNes	   of	   the	   arbitrator	  were	  merely	   his
status	  in	  the	  community,	  his	  reputaNon,	  being	  from	  a	  strong	  tribe,	  his	  wisdom	  and	  reasoning
skills.	  The	   instrument	  used	   to	  ensure	  enforceability	  of	   the	  arbitraNon	  award,	  as	  courts	  did
not	  exist	  at	   that	  Nme,	  was	   that	  disputants	  were	   to	  put	  up	  some	  sort	  of	   securiNes	   such	  as
property.	  Besides	  this	  security,	  the	  ‘social	  status’	  of	  the	  arbitrator	  meant	  it	  was	  very	  unlikely
for	  the	  losing	  party	  to	  challenge	  his	  award	  (Gemmell,	  2007).
ArbitraNon	  was	  the	  most	  prominent	  method	  of	  dispute	  resoluNon	  primarily	  because	  of	  the
absence	  of	  a	  formal	  court	  system	  during	  the	  early	  days	  of	   Islam.	   Islam	   legalised,	   reformed
and	  regulated	  the	  arbitraNon	  process,	  resulNng	  in	  a	  more	  organised	  procedure	  (Fakih,	  2011).
This	  reform	  handled	  core	  conceptual	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  ‘arbitrability’	  of	  disputes,	  the	  validity
and	   binding	   nature	   of	   the	   arbitraNon	   agreement,	   the	   ﬁnality	   and	   binding	   nature	   of	   an
arbitral	  award,	  the	  form	  of	  the	  arbitral	  award,	  and	  the	  arbitraNon	  law	  governing	  the	  dispute.
It	   also	   handled	   procedural	   issues	   such	   as	   the	   dismissal	   of	   an	   arbitrator	   aier
the	  commencement	  of	  proceedings.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Islamic	  era	  witnessed	  the	  disNncNon
between	  reconciliatory	  se]lement	  (Sulh),	   arbitraNon,	   and	   court	   liNgaNon	   (Gemmell,	   2007,
Alsheikh,	  2011).
Nonetheless,	   during	   the	   early	   ages	   of	   Islam,	   there	   was	   a	   debate	   on	   the	   concept	   of
arbitraNon.	  The	  ﬁrst	  school	  of	   thought	  held	  that	  arbitraNon	  was	  close	   to	  conciliaNon.	  As	   a
result,	  an	  arbitral	  award	  given	  by	  the	  arbiter	  was	  not	  binding.	  The	  second	  school	  of	  thought,
represenNng	   the	  majority	   of	  Muslim	   scholars,	   argued	   that	   arbitraNon	   was	   diﬀerent	   from
conciliaNon	  because	   an	   arbitral	   award	  was	   binding	   and	   enforceable	   as	   a	  court	   judgement
(Alsheikh,	  2011,	  Al-­‐Ramahi,	  2008,	  Rashid,	  2008,	  Ahdab	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  Other	  scholars	  argued
that	   the	   start	   of	   an	   arbitraNon	   process	   was	   similar	   to	   conciliaNon	   but	   it	   would	   gradually
move	  towards	  being	  obligatory	  arbitraNon.	  Yet,	  they	  do	  not	  concur	  on	   the	  milestone	  aier
which	  the	  process	  switched	  from	  being	  consensual	  to	  being	  obligatory;	   is	   it	  the	  arbitraNon
agreement,	  the	  actual	  commencement	  of	  procedure,	  or	  the	  issuance	  of	  the	  award?	   In	   the
opinion	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  scholars,	  arbitraNon	  in	  Islamic	  philosophy	  was	  not	  obligatory	  unNl
the	  issuance	  of	  an	  award	  (Alsheikh,	  2011).	  This	   'majority	  opinion'	   is	  manifested	  in	  the	  800-­‐
year	  old	  book	  'Al-­‐Hedaya';	  one	  of	  the	  most	   inﬂuenNal	  and	  authoritaNve	  sources	  on	  Islamic
law.	   In	   its	   arbitraNon	   chapter,	   it	   states	   that	   "either	   party	  may	   retract	   from	   the	  arbitra1on
opinion	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  scholars,	  arbitraNon	  in	  Islamic	  philosophy	  was	  not	  obligatory	  unNl
the	  issuance	  of	  an	  award	  (Alsheikh,	  2011).	  This	   'majority	  opinion'	   is	  manifested	  in	  the	  800-­‐
year	  old	  book	  'Al-­‐Hedaya';	  one	  of	  the	  most	   inﬂuenNal	  and	  authoritaNve	  sources	  on	  Islamic
law.	   In	   its	   arbitraNon	   chapter,	   it	   states	   that	   "either	   party	  may	   retract	   from	   the	  arbitra1on
before	  the	  award…the	  award,	  however,	  when	  given,	  is	  binding	  upon	  them"(Hamilton,	  1994).
The	   arbitraNon	   chapter	   includes	   rules	   on	   the	   qualiNes	   of	   an	   arbitrator	   that	   should	  match
those	   of	   a	   judge,	   the	   binding	   nature	   of	   arbitraNon	   award,	   the	   enforcement	   procedure	   of
arbitraNon	  award,	  the	  arbitrability	  of	  disputes,	  validity	  of	  the	  arbitral	  award	  and	  ground	  for
its	  annulment,	  witness	  examinaNon,	  deliberaNon	  by	   the	   tribunal	  etc.	   (Hamilton,	  1994).	   Al-­‐
Hedaya	  also	  contains	  a	  disNnct	  chapter	  for	  amicable	  se]lement	  (Book	  of	  Al-­‐Sulh).
This	  debate	  means	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  consensus	  also	  applies	  to	  the	  validity	  and	  binding	  nature
of	   the	   arbitraNon	   agreement	   itself.	   While	   some	   scholars	   maintained	   that	   an	   arbitraNon
agreement	  was	  valid	  and	  binding,	  others	  argued	  it	  was	  valid	  but	  non-­‐binding	  as	  either	  party
could	  unilaterally	  revoke	  it	  (i.e.	  revocable	  agreement).	  The	  argument	  over	   its	   validity	  went
down	  to	  the	  division	  between	  future	  disputes	  and	  extant	  disputes.	  Some	  authors	  argue	  that
Islamic	  philosophy	  proposes	  that	  a	  contractual	  clause	  requiring	  the	  parNes	  to	  submit	   	  future
disputes	  to	  arbitraNon	  (arbitraNon	  clause)	   is	   invalid,	  and	  a	  separate	  agreement	  (submission
agreement)	   is	   the	   only	   valid	   form.	   The	   raNonale	   behind	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   that	   the
nonexistence	   of	   a	   dispute	   when	   an	   arbitraNon	   clause	   was	   agreed	   upon	   would	   lead	   to
speculaNon	  (Gharar);	  a	  principle	  of	  Islamic	  law	  that	  strikes	  down	  any	  provision	  that	  is	  subject
to	  an	  uncertainty.	  Furthermore,	  a	  very	  long	  gap	  may	  occur	  between	  the	  Nme	  of	  entering	  into
the	   agreement	   and	   an	   ensuing	   dispute.	   In	   the	   meanNme,	   either	   party	   may	   lose	   its
enthusiasm	  for	  arbitraNon	  yet	  be	  legally	  obliged	  to	  parNcipate	  in	  the	  process.	  Then	  this	  party
may	   try	   to	   create	   hurdles	   in	   the	  way	   of	   the	   smooth	   conduct	   of	   arbitral	   proceedings	   and
ulNmately	   in	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  award	  with	  counterproducNve	  consequences	  (Rashid,
2004).	   However,	   Al-­‐Qurashi	   (2004)	   disagrees	   with	   Rashid’s	   conclusions	   and	   argues	   that
arbitraNon	   clauses	   are	   valid	   since	   they	   do	   not	   permit	  what	   is	   explicitly	   prohibited	   by	   the
Islamic	  law.
This	   intellectual	  debate	  took	  place	  throughout	  the	  centuries	  up	   to	   the	  19th	  century.	   In	   the
19th	  century,	  expanding	  trade	  and	  commercial	  transacNons	  brought	  modern	  legal	  challenges
to	  the	  resoluNon	  of	  commercial	  disputes.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  state	  of	  distress	  among	  the	  O]oman
judiciary	  (the	  O]oman	  Caliphate,	  the	  last	  Islamic	  Caliphate,	  ruled	  over	  PalesNne	  from	  1517-­‐
1917).	   The	   distress	  was	  because	   at	   that	   Nme,	   although	   Islamic	   law	   had	   formed	   the	   legal
infrastructure	  of	  the	  O]oman	  Caliphate,	  no	  Islamic	  civil	  code	  existed	  and	  the	  rules	  governing
contracts	  were	  sca]ered	  (Terris	  and	  Inoue-­‐Terris,	  2002).	  Inﬂuenced	  by	  the	  French	  civil	  code,
the	  O]omans	  started	  the	  ﬁrst	  codiﬁcaNon	  of	  Islamic	   law.	  In	  1877,	   the	  codiﬁcaNon	  process
produced	   the	  O]oman	  Civil	  Code	  known	  as	   “Majallat	  Al-­‐Ahkam	  Al-­‐Adliya“	   (in	   Arabic:	   ةلجم
ةيلدعلا	  ماكحلأا),	  brieﬂy	  known	  as	  Al-­‐Majallah	  (Khadduri	   and	   Liebesny,	   2008).	   It	   appears	   that
this	  codiﬁcaNon	  has	  delivered	  "general	  principles	  of	   Islamic	  contract	   law"	  (Bunni,	  1997).	   In
Al-­‐Majallah,	   a	   complete	   chapter	   (arNcles	   1841-­‐1851)	   has	   been	   dedicated	   to	   arbitraNon.
These	   arNcles	   address	   the	   arbitrability	   of	   disputes,	   the	   validity	   and	   enforceability	   of	   an
arbitral	   award,	   the	   formaNon	  of	   an	  arbitral	   tribunal,	   the	   dismissal	   of	   arbitrators,	   Nme	   for
issuance	  of	  award,	  the	  tribunal	  authority	  to	  conciliate	  dispute	  (Al-­‐Sulh).
 
In	  ArNcle	  1850,	  Al-­‐Majallah	  introduced	  an	  "original	  insNtuNon	  of	  ArbitraNon	  by	  ConciliaNon"
(Palmer,	  2005):
	  	  	  	  "Legally	  appointed	  arbitrators	  may	  validly	  reconcile	  the	  par1es	  if	  the	  la>er	  have	  conferred	  on	  them
that	  power.	  Therefore,	  if	  each	  of	  the	  par1es	  has	  given	  powers	  to	  one	  of	  the	  arbitrators	  to	  reconcile
them	   and	   the	   arbitrators	   terminate	   the	   case	   by	   a	   se>lement	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   provisions
contained	  in	  the	  Book	  of	  Se>lements	  [Aqd	  Al	  Sulh],	  the	  par1es	  may	  not	  reject	  the	  arrangement."
This	   technique	  resembles	   the	  21st	  century	  dispute	  resoluNon	  method	  of	  Med-­‐Arb	  that	   is	   a
hybrid	  of	  mediaNon	  and	  arbitraNon	  (Palmer,	  2005).	  ArNcle	   1531	   in	   Al-­‐Majallah	   deﬁnes	   Al-­‐
Sulh	   as	   a	   contract	   se]ling	   a	   dispute	   by	   mutual	   consent	   and	   is	   concluded	   by	   oﬀer	   and
acceptance	   (Rashid,	   2004).	   Al-­‐Sulh	   is	   a	   dispute	   resoluNon	   method	   that	   is	   highly
recommended	   in	   Islam.	   It	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   ‘amicable	   se]lement	   of	   disputes’	   which
includes	  various	  modes	  of	  resoluNon	  such	  as	  assisted	  negoNaNon	  or	  mediaNon/conciliaNon
(Rashid,	  2004).	  Al-­‐Sulh	  concept	   is	  very	  similar	  but	  not	   the	  exact	  equivalent	   to	   the	  modern
concepts	  of	  mediaNon	  and	  conciliaNon(Palmer,	  2005).
Rashid	   (2008)	   contends	   that	   Al-­‐Majallah	   has	   concluded	   the	   centuries-­‐old	   debate	   on	   the
validity	  of	  arbitraNon	  clauses.	  He	  states	  that	  arNcles	  1847-­‐1850	  sNpulate	  that	  an	  arbitraNon
agreement	  is	  valid	  if	  it	  is	  entered	  into	  aier	  a	  dispute	  has	  arisen.	  The	  authors	  disagree	  with
this	  interpretaNon	  and	  think	  that	  Al-­‐Majallah	  is	  silent	  on	  this	  issue.	  The	  authors	  believe	  that
this	   debate	   has	   been	   concluded	   by	   the	   modern	   arbitraNon	   laws	   of	   the	   Arab	   countries
including	  PalesNne	  that	  permit	  arbitraNon	  clauses.
agreement	  is	  valid	  if	  it	  is	  entered	  into	  aier	  a	  dispute	  has	  arisen.	  The	  authors	  disagree	  with
this	  interpretaNon	  and	  think	  that	  Al-­‐Majallah	  is	  silent	  on	  this	  issue.	  The	  authors	  believe	  that
this	   debate	   has	   been	   concluded	   by	   the	   modern	   arbitraNon	   laws	   of	   the	   Arab	   countries
including	  PalesNne	  that	  permit	  arbitraNon	  clauses.
Recent	  Development	  of	  Arbitra&on	  in	  modern	  Pales&ne	  (aFer	  20th	  century)
Following	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   O]oman	   Caliphate,	   and	   when	   PalesNne	   became	   under	   the
BriNsh	  Mandate	  in	  1917,	  the	  1926	  ArbitraNon	  Ordinance	  was	  passed	  into	  law.	  It	  was	  a	  mirror
of	  the	  English	  ArbitraNon	  Act	  of	  1889.	  As	  an	  extension	  to	  the	  BriNsh	  Empire,	  PalesNne	  was	  a
signatory	  to	  the	  Geneva	  Protocol	  on	  ArbitraNon	  of	  1923	  and	  later	  the	  Geneva	  ConvenNon	  on
ExecuNon	  of	  Foreign	  Arbitral	  Awards.	  Then,	  the	  1930	  Foreign	  ArbitraNon	  Awards	  Act	  and	  the
1935	  ArbitraNon	  Procedures	  Act	  were	  passed	  into	  law.	  A	  further	  two	  acts	  were	  enacted	   in
1952	  	  for	  the	  Enforcement	  of	  Foreign	  Provisions	  Act	  and	  in	  the	  1953	  ArbitraNon	  Law,	  both	  in
eﬀect	  in	  the	  West	  Bank	  (Katbeh,	  2015,	  Sarcevic,	  2009).
A	   few	   years	   aier	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   PalesNnian	   NaNonal	   Authority	   in	   1994,	   the
ArbitraNon	  Act	  No	  (3)	  came	  into	  force	  in	  2000	  based	  on	  the	  United	  NaNons	  Commission	  on
InternaNonal	  Trade	  Law	  (UNCITRAL)	  Model	  Law	  on	  InternaNonal	  Commercial	  ArbitraNon	  of
1986	  (the	  Model	  Law)	  besides	   other	   Arab	   and	   internaNonal	   arbitraNon	   laws	   (Davis	   et	   al.,
2005).	  This	  has	  been	  a	  major	  reform	  to	  modernise,	  unify	  and	  harmonise	  arbitraNon	  pracNce
in	  PalesNne	   (Katbeh,	  2015).	  This	  act	   concludes	   the	  centuries-­‐old	   debate	   on	   the	   validity	   of
arbitraNon	  clauses.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  internaNonal	  pracNce,	  it	  considers	  them	  valid.	  Besides,	  in
what	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  extension	  to	  the	  long-­‐lasNng	  Islamic	  jurisprudence	  as	  manifested	  in	  Al-­‐
Hedaya	  and	  ArNcle	  1850	  of	  the	  Majalla,	  ArNcles	  (36)	  of	  the	  PalesNnian	  ArbitraNon	  Act	  2000
provides	   that	   one	   of	   the	   disputants	   may	   authorise	   the	   tribunal	   to	   undertake	   Al-­‐Sulh
(reconciliaNon)	  procedures	  according	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  fairness.	  The	  ArNcle	  provides	  that
the	   tribunal	  may,	   upon	   request	   of	   any	   of	   the	   parNes	   or	   by	   its	   own	  discreNon,	   suggest	   an
amicable	   se]lement	   to	   the	   dispute.	   Further,	   similar	   to	   most	   arbitraNon	   acts	   around	   the
world,	   speciﬁcally	   those	   modelled	   on	   UNCITRAL	   Model	   Law,	   the	   ArbitraNon	   Act	   2000
recognises	   the	   separability	   doctrine,	   competence-­‐competence	   principle	   and the	   parNes’
autonomy	  to	  form	  their	  own	  arbitral	  tribunal	  and	  choose	  applicable	  laws.	  It	  also	  deﬁnes	  the
role	  of	  state	  courts,	  the	  grounds	  for	  challenging	  arbitral	  awards	  and	  so	  on.
 
However,	  due	   to	   some	  shortcomings	   in	   this	  Act	  as	  well	  as	  contemporary	   developments	   in
internaNonal	  arbitraNon	  pracNce,	  a	  new	  reform	  has	  become	  vital.	  At	  the	  very	  Nme	  of	  wriNng
this	   paper,	   a	   drai	   for	   a	   new	   arbitraNon	   Act	   is	   under	   preparaNon	   to	   produce	   a	   more
comprehensive	  Act	   in	   line	  with	   the	   recent	  pracNces	  embedded	   in	   the	  Model	   Law	  and	   the
New	   York	   ConvenNon.	   The	   main	   proposed	   changes	   will	   modernise	   the	   deﬁniNon	   of
arbitraNon	  agreement	  and	  the	  concepts	  underlying	  the	  formaNon	  of	  an	  arbitral	  tribunal,	  and
will	  minimise	  the	  judges’	  intervenNonist	  powers	  in	  the	  arbitraNon	  process	  (Katbeh,	  2015).
In	  2015,	  the	  State	  of	  PalesNne	  joined	  the	  1958	  New	  York	  ConvenNon	  on	  the	  RecogniNon	  and
Enforcement	   of	   Foreign	   Arbitral	   Awards	   (Kluwer	   ArbitraNon,	   2014,	   New	   York	   ConvenNon
Guide,	   2015).	   This	   has	  been	  a	   signiﬁcant	   step	   to	  promote	   internaNonal	  arbitraNon	   and	   to
ensure	   internaNonal	   organisaNons	   that	   a	   modern	   mechanism	   complying	   with	   the
internaNonal	  best	  pracNce	  to	  recognise	  and	  enforce	  arbitral	  awards	  is	  in	  place.
Research	  Findings
Alterna&ve	  Dispute	  Resolu&on	  (ADR)	  ins&tu&ons
The	  parNcipants	  were	  asked	  ‘what’	  the	  insNtuNons	  oﬀering	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  services,
training	   and	   cerNﬁcaNon	   are.	   InsNtuNons	   oﬀering	   arbitraNon	   services	   for	   construcNon,
engineering,	   and	   technology	   disputes	   are	   the	  AssociaNon	  of	   Engineers	   (AOE),	   Engineering
ArbitraNon	   Centre	   (EAC),	   the	   PalesNnian	   Contractors	   Union	   (PCU),	   and	   the	   recently
established	  PalesNnian	  InternaNonal	  ArbitraNon	  Chamber	  (PIAC).	  The	  EAC	  and	  the	  PIAC	  also
oﬀers	  training,	  examinaNon	  and	  cerNﬁcaNon	  schemes	  in	  arbitraNon.
 
Court	  Li&ga&on
The	  interviewees	  were	  asked	  ‘how	  oien’	  construcNon	  parNes	  refer	  their	  disputes	  to	  courts,
and	  if	  there	  is	  any	  mulN-­‐door	  courthouse	  in	  PalesNne?	  Then,	  they	  were	  asked	  ‘how’	  a	  judge
decides	  on	  the	  dispute.
The	   respondents	   stated	   that	   the	   judiciary	   does	   not	   oﬀer	   a	   ‘mulN-­‐door’	   courthouse	   (i.e.
court-­‐annexed	  ADR	  programs).	  However,	  according	  to	  the	  Civil	  and	  Commercial	  Procedures
Act	  No	  (2)	  -­‐	  2000,	  the	  High	  Judicial	  Council	  may	  appoint	  a	  judge,	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  parNes,
to	   a]empt	   to	   conciliate	   or	   amicably	   se]le	   civil	   and	   commercial	   disputes	   referred	   to	   the
courts	  of	  ﬁrst	  instance	  and	  the	  magistrate.	  The	  se]lement	  process	  shall	  be	  accomplished	  in
60	  days	  from	  the	  day	  of	  referring	  the	  case	  to	  the	  conciliaNon	  judge,	  unless	  the	  parNes	  agree
otherwise.	   In	   the	   courthouse,	   this	   judge	   administers	   the	   se]lement	   process	   that	   is	   a
perfectly	  voluntarily	  process.	  This	  means	  the	  court	  has	  no	  right	  to	  penalise	  any	  of	  the	  parNes
courts	  of	  ﬁrst	  instance	  and	  the	  magistrate.	  The	  se]lement	  process	  shall	  be	  accomplished	  in
60	  days	  from	  the	  day	  of	  referring	  the	  case	  to	  the	  conciliaNon	  judge,	  unless	  the	  parNes	  agree
otherwise.	   In	   the	   courthouse,	   this	   judge	   administers	   the	   se]lement	   process	   that	   is	   a
perfectly	  voluntarily	  process.	  This	  means	  the	  court	  has	  no	  right	  to	  penalise	  any	  of	  the	  parNes
for	  its	  withdrawal,	  disregard	  or	  refusal	  of	  the	  conciliaNon	  opNon.	  If	  one	  of	  the	  parNes	  refuses
to	  parNcipate,	  or	  withdraw	  later	  on,	  or	  the	  conciliaNon	  fails	  to	  se]le	  the	  dispute,	   the	   case
goes	   back	   to	   liNgaNon	   without	   jeopardising	   any	   of	   the	   parNes’	   rights.	   NoNceably,	   the
provisions	   68-­‐78	   of	   the	   Act	   use	   the	   terms	   ‘se]lement’,	   ‘conciliaNon’,	   and	   ‘Sulh’
interchangeably.	  This	   role	  has	  never	  been	  pracNced	  yet,	  as	  all	   the	   interviewees	  conﬁrmed.
The	   legal	   interviewees	   a]ributed	   this	   to	   the	   courts’	   insuﬃcient	   resources	   (judges,
administraNve	   staﬀ	  etc.)	   to	   handle	   the	   increasing	   caseload	   that	   possibly	   forces	   judges	   to
overlook	  this	  consensual	  dispute	  resoluNon	  ‘role’.
The	  respondents	  stated	  that	  when	  a	   judge	  receives	  a	  construcNon	  or	  engineering	  case,	  he
might	  ask	  the	  disputants	   if	   they	  want	  to	  a]empt	  to	  se]le	  the	  dispute	  amicably	  or	  he	  may
ask	  them	  if	  they	  want	  to	  arbitrate.	  If	  they	  accept	  the	  former,	  either	  party	  may	  make	  oﬀers
and	  counter-­‐oﬀers	   to	   se]le	   the	  dispute	  before	   the	   judge	  or	   they	  may	   try	   to	   se]le	  out-­‐of-­‐
court.	  As	  conﬁrmed	  by	  2	  interviewees,	  two	  construcNon	  cases	  were	  se]led	  in	  this	  way	  and
the	   court	   proceedings	   came	   to	   an	   end.	   It	   is	   worth	   noNng	   here	   that	   the	   judge	   does	   not
pracNce	   any	   kind	   of	   mediaNon	   in	   this	   case,	   simply	   because	  mediaNon	   is	   not	   part	   of	   the
judiciary	   system,	   and	   not	   recognised	   in	   law.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   if	   the	   parNes	   agree	   to
arbitrate,	  the	  judge	  will	  refer	  the	  dispute	  to	  an	  arbitral	  tribunal	  out	  of	  the	  courthouse.	  The
arbitrators	  are	  to	  be	  selected	  by	  the	  disputants,	  but	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  agree,	  arbitrators	  are	  to	  be
nominated	  by	   the	  court	   (from	   its	   list	  of	  arbitrators)	  or	  by	   the	  arbitral	   insNtuNon	   the	  court
refers	  the	  case	  to.
If	  either	  one	  of	  the	  disputants	  insists	  on	  liNgaNon,	  the	  judge	  who	  is	  not	  knowledgeable	  in	  the
technicaliNes	  of	  the	  engineering	  or	  construcNon	  works	  will	  normally	  refer	  the	  case,	  or	  part
of	  it	  depending	  on	  its	  complexity,	  for	  expert	  opinion	  to	  evaluate	  the	  technical	  merits	  of	  the
dispute.	  An	   expert	   can	   be	   selected	   by	   the	   parNes,	   or	   in	   case	   the	   parNes	   fail	   to	   agree,	   an
expert	  will	  be	  appointed	  by	  the	  court	  (from	  its	  list	  of	  experts)	  or	  by	  the	  insNtuNon	  the	  case	  is
referred	   to.	   The	   expert’s	   main	   job	   is	   normally	   quanNﬁcaNon	   of	   damages	   resulNng	   from
compensaNon	   events,	   defecNve	   works	   or	   breach	   of	   contract,	   and	   measurement	   and
valuaNon	  of	  works	  done.	  In	  addiNon,	  the	  expert’s	  scope	  of	  work	  extends	  someNmes	  to	  the
apporNonment	   of	   liability	   for	   the	   defecNve	  works	   or	   breach	   of	   contract.	  Oien,	   the	   judge
endorses	   the	  expert’s	  ﬁndings	   but	   he	  may	  use	  his	   own	  discreNon	   in	   legal	   and	   contractual
ma]ers	  according	  to	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  law.
The	   main	   types	   of	   construcNon	   disputes	   that	   reach	   courts,	   in	   the	   experience	   of	   the
interviewees	   and	   as	   per	   the	   construcNon	   cases	   retrieved	   from	   Al-­‐Muqtaﬁ,	   are	   related	   to
requests	   for	   conﬁrmaNon	   or	   annulment	   of	   arbitral	   awards,	   urgent	   requests	   to	   stop
construcNon	   contract	   award,	   urgent	   requests	   to	   stop	   construcNon	   works	   due	   to	   land
ownership	   dispute	   or	   to	   protect	   artefacts	   and	   archaeological	   assets,	   insurance,	   ﬁnancial
claim	  for	  addiNonal	  costs,	  loss	  and/or	  expense	  claims	  .
The	   interviewees	  concur,	  and	  the	   judge	  aﬃrms,	   that	   few	  construcNon	  cases	  end	   in	  courts.
This	   is	   because	   the	   courts	   are	   overburdened	  with	   cases	   and	   lack	   technical	   knowledge	   to
process	   construcNon	   disputes.	   The	   backlog	   of	   cases,	   as	   well	   as	   technical	   incompetence,
means	  that	  court	  judgements	  on	  construcNon	  cases	  take	  3-­‐5	  years	  on	  average,	  including	  two
levels	  of	  appeals,	  and	  someNmes	  longer.	  This	  esNmate	  is	  in	  accordance	  to	  the	  experience	  of
an	  eminent	  lawyer	  and	  has	  been	  corroborated	  by	  the	  construcNon	  cases	  retrieved	  from	  Al-­‐
Muqtaﬁ.	  	  Needless	  to	  say,	  this	  does	  not	  seem	  an	  appealing	  opNon	  for	  contractors	  who	  are
desperate	   for	   cash.	  As	   an	   interviewee	   stated,	   "contractors	   tend	   to	   compromise	   their	   total
en1tlement	  and	  waive	  some	  of	  what	  they	  think	  they	  are	  en1tled	  to	  in	  return	  for	  immediate
cash	   in	   hand".	   This	   brings	   to	  mind	   the	  maxim	   of	   "jusNce	   delayed	   is	   jusNce	   denied".	   The
interviewees	  stated	  that	  parNes	  end	  up	  in	  courts	  if	  the	  defendant	  is	  not	  interested	  to	  se]le
the	  dispute	  in	  arbitraNon	  or	  any	  other	  ADR	  method.	  In	  this	  situaNon,	  the	  defendant,	  who	  is
usually	  the	  employer,	   leaves	   the	  contractor	  with	   two	  courses	  of	  acNons;	  going	   to	  court	  or
giving	   up	   its	   claims.	   This	   reﬂects	   the	   employer	   conﬁdence	   that	   courts	   are	   not	   a	   proper
dispute	  resoluNon	  venue.	  Instead,	  courts	  tend	  to	  be	  a	  “dispute	  freezing”	  venue.
Further,	  parNes	  do	  not	  seek	  court	  liNgaNon	  because	  of	  the	  paucity	  of	  projects	  and	  business
opportuniNes	   that	   make	   contractors	   very	   reluctant	   to	   sue	   employers.	   Furthermore,	   the
naNonal	  culture	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  people’s	  lack	  of	  appeNte	  to	  ‘adversarial’	  liNgaNon.	  PalesNnians
prefer	   amicable	   se]lements	   to	   their	   disputes	   to	   protect	   the	   social	   fabric	   and	   also	   to
maintain	   business	   relaNonships.	   Also,	   the	   decades	   of	   poliNcal	   instability	   and	   military
occupaNons	   made	   PalesNnians	   distant	   from	   courts	   and	   closer	   to	   alternaNve	   dispute
resoluNon	  methods.	  These	  alternaNve	  methods,	  including	  arbitraNon,	  play	  an	  important	  role
to	   overcome	   overwhelming	   insNtuNonal	   challenges	   facing transiNoning	   states	   such	   as
maintain	   business	   relaNonships.	   Also,	   the	   decades	   of	   poliNcal	   instability	   and	   military
occupaNons	   made	   PalesNnians	   distant	   from	   courts	   and	   closer	   to	   alternaNve	   dispute
resoluNon	  methods.	  These	  alternaNve	  methods,	  including	  arbitraNon,	  play	  an	  important	  role




The	   respondents	   were	   asked	   to	   describe	   how	   the	   pracNce	   of	   construcNon	   arbitraNon
evolved	   in	   PalesNne.	   While	   the	   literature	   review	   provides	   important	   insight	   into	   the
historical	  development	  of	  arbitraNon	  in	  PalesNne	  up	  to	  the	  modern	  Nme,	  the	  respondents’
recollecNons	   and	   available	   accessible	   court	   cases	   are	   limited	   to	   the	   last	   two	   or	   three
decades.
Commercial	   arbitraNon	   was	   used	   before	   the	   establishment	   of the	   PalesNnian	   NaNonal
Authority	   in	   1994 but	   to	   a	   very	   limited	   extent.	   For	   instance,	   besides	   anecdotal	   evidence
from	  interviewees,	  fossil	   evidence	   on	   this	   is	   found	   in	   the	   Court	   of	   CassaNon	  Decision	  No.
214/2005	  (Civil	  SecNon/	  Ramallah).	  This	   case	   shows	   that	  the	  disputants	  agreed	  before	   the
court	  in	  1986	  to	  refer	  their	  dispute	  to	  ad-­‐hoc	  arbitraNon.	  However,	  based	  on	  logic	  in	  light	  of
the	   absence	   of	   empirical	   evidence,	   the	   use	   of	   commercial	   arbitraNon	   and	   construcNon
arbitraNon	  in	  parNcular	  prior	  to	  the	  nineNes	  was	  probably	  relaNvely	  rare.	  Due	  to	  an	  obsolete
arbitraNon	  law	  and	  an	  ineﬃcient	  court	  that	  would	  take	  several	  years	  to	  enforce	  an	  arbitral
award,	  disputants	  seemed	  to	  rely	  heavily	  on	  the	  conciliatory	  approach	  or	  Al-­‐Sulh.
The	   authors’	   reconstrucNon	   of	   the	   evoluNon	   of	   construcNon	   arbitraNon,	   based	   on	   the
available	  empirical	  evidence,	  suggests	  five	  milestones	   that	  pushed	  construcNon	  arbitraNon
forward	   (the	   establishment	   of	   the	   PalesNnian	   NaNonal	   Authority,	   the	   legal	   reforms,	   the
widespread	  incorporaNon	  of	  arbitraNon	  clauses	  in	  construcNon	  contracts,	  the	  establishment
of	  arbitraNon	  insNtuNons	  and	  increasing	  parNcipaNon	  of	  qualiﬁed	  arbitrators).	  Nevertheless,
considerable	  challenges	  sNll	  prevent	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  from	  reaching	  its	  full	  potenNal.
The	   drivers	   and	   barriers	   for	   a	   wider	   use	   of	   construcNon	   arbitraNon	   are	   discussed	   in	   the
following	  secNons.
The	  transi&onal	  period:	  from	  libera&on	  to	  state	  building
The	   signing	   of	   Oslo	   peace	   agreement	   between	   the	   PalesNne	   LiberaNon	   OrganisaNon	   and
Israel	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Israeli	  occupaNon.	  The	  establishment	  of the
PalesNnian	   NaNonal	   Authority	   in	   1994	   and	   the	   subsequent	   ﬂood	   of	   dollars	   from	   donors
paved	  the	  way	  for	  a	  construcNon	  boom	  (El-­‐namrouty,	  2012).	  As	  an	  emerging	  state,	  PalesNne
has	   been	   in	   need	   of	   signiﬁcant	   investments	   in	   infrastructure	   projects.	   These	   projects	   are
funded	   and/or	   implemented	   by	   the	   government	   or	   by	   internaNonal	   organisaNons.	   Since
then,	   internaNonal	   organisaNons	   (internaNonal	   governmental	   organisaNons,	   governmental
development	   organisaNons	   or	   non-­‐governmental	   organisaNons)	   have	   become	   important
actors	  in	  the	  construcNon	  scene.
Beyond	   the	   dust	   caused	   by	   the	   rapidly	   increasing	   construcNon	   works,	   a	   problem	   was
crystallising.	   ConstrucNon	   contractors,	   both	   domesNc	   and	   internaNonal,	   had	   a	   serious
problem	  in	  having	  access	  to	  jusNce.	  DomesNc	  contractors	  considered	  court	  liNgaNon	  as	  slow
and	   ineﬃcient	   and	   taking	   many	   years.	   Besides	   this,	   internaNonal	   contractors	   would	   not
accept	  to	  refer	  their	  disputes	  to	  PalesNnian	  courts	  because	  of	  the	  fear	  of	   lack	  of	  neutrality
and	   poliNcal	   independence.	   In	   that	   period,	   the	   respondents	   conﬁrmed,	   the	   "conciliatory
approach"	  was	  the	  acceptable	  alternaNve	  dispute	  resoluNon	  technique	  whereby	  disputants
used	  to	  select	  a	  conciliator	  or	  would	  ask	  the	  AssociaNon	  of	  Engineers	  to	  nominate	  him.	  The
conciliator,	  who	  used	   to	  be	   an	  Engineer,	   only	  made	   recommendaNons.	   In	   cases	  where	   an
amicable	  approach	   failed	   to	  se]le	   the	  controversy,	  contractors	   in	  many	  cases	  appeared	   to
give	   up	   their	   claims.	   Hence,	   employers	   had	   a	   duty	   to	   provide	   contractors	   with	   access	   to
jusNce.
To	  meet	   this	   challenge,	   employers	   (governmental	   or	   internaNonal)	   started	   to	   incorporate
arbitraNon	  clauses	   in	   their	   condiNons	  of	   contract.	   For	   instance,	  as	   one	   respondent	   stated,
the	  PalesNnian	  Economic	  Council	  for	  Development	  and	  ReconstrucNon	  (PECDAR)	  inserted	  an
arbitraNon	  clause	  in	  their	  World	  Bank	  ﬁnanced	  construcNon	  contracts	  designaNng	  the	  Cairo
Regional	   Centre	   for	   InternaNonal	   Commercial	   ArbitraNon	   as	   the	   insNtuNon	   to	   refer	   future
disputes	  to.	  During	  the	  transiNonal	  period,	  PECDAR	  was	  the	  main	  employer	  responsible	  for
the	   delivery	   of	   construcNon	   and	   infrastructure	   projects,	   leaving	   a	   minor	   role	   for
municipaliNes	  and	  ministries	  (Silverburg,	  2002).
Despite	   the	   increasing	   inserNon	   of	   arbitraNon	   clauses	   in	   construcNon	   contracts,	   the
respondents	  assert	   that	   construcNon	  arbitraNon	  was rarely	  pracNced	   in	   the	  nineNes.	  Also,
	  Al-­‐Muqtaﬁ	  has	  only	  one	  court	  case	  related	  to	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  conducted	  between
two	  private	  parNes	  in	  the	  nineNes.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  Decision	  No.	  181/1995	  (Civil	  SecNon
/	   Ramallah)	   arose	   from	   a	   request	   to	   set	   aside	   a	   construcNon	   arbitral	   award	   rendered	   in
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  Al-­‐Muqtaﬁ	  has	  only	  one	  court	  case	  related	  to	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  conducted	  between
two	  private	  parNes	  in	  the	  nineNes.	  The	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  Decision	  No.	  181/1995	  (Civil	  SecNon
/	   Ramallah)	   arose	   from	   a	   request	   to	   set	   aside	   a	   construcNon	   arbitral	   award	   rendered	   in
1994.	  Al-­‐Muqtaﬁ	  has	  many	  more	   commercial	   arbitraNon	   court	   cases	   that	   were	   lodged	   to
courts	   in	   the	   same	   Nme	   period.	   This	   may	   indicate,	   but	   not	   necessarily,	   that	   commercial
arbitraNon	  was	  more	  common	  than	  construcNon	  arbitraNon.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  conclusive
evidence	   because	   not	   all	   arbitraNon	   cases	   end	   in	   court	   dockets	   waiNng	   conﬁrmaNon	   or
enforcement.	   ConstrucNon	   disputants	  may	   have	   voluntarily	   accepted	   arbitral	   awards	   and
hence	  lei	  no	  evidence	  in	  the	  courts’	  archives.	  Also,	  the	  available	   legal	  material	   is	  selecNve
and	  limited	  to	  those	  that	  reach	  the	  court	  of	  appeal	  or	  the	  court	  of	  cassaNon.	  Regardless	  of
the	  actual	  number	  of	  construcNon	  arbitraNons,	   the	   fundamental	   reason	  for	   the	  scarcity	  of
construcNon	  arbitraNon	  was	  probably	   the	   lack	  of	  well-­‐developed	  arbitraNon	   infrastructure
(modern	   legal	   framework,	   contractual	   machinery,	   arbitraNon	   insNtuNons,	   qualiﬁed
arbitrators	  and	  experienced	  judiciary).
Deteriorated	  legal	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  need	  for	  legal	  reforms
As	   a	   transiNoning	   state,	   PalesNne	   had	   considerable	   insNtuNonal	   challenges	   and	   lacked	   a
modern	  and	  eﬃcient	  legal	  infrastructure.	  In	  the	  nineNes,	  	  arbitraNon	  clauses	  in	  construcNon
contracts	   lacked	  an	  adequate	   enforcement	   regime.	  Hence,	   construcNon	   contractors	   had	   a
serious	  challenge	  to	  have	  access	  to	  jusNce.
In	  cases	  where	   internaNonal	  contractors	  were	  the	  winner	  of	   internaNonal	  arbitraNon,	  they
probably	   had	   diﬃculNes	   to	   enforce	   arbitral	   awards	   because	   the	   PalesNnian	   NaNonal
Authority	  was	  not	  a	  state	  and	  was	  not	  a	  signatory	  to	  New	  York	  convenNon	  (e.g.	  Danish	  Road
Contractors	  v	  PECDAR)	  (the	  World	  Bank,	  1999,	  Sharon	  et	  al.,	  2010).
DomesNc	   contractors	   were	   not	  more	   fortunate	   because	   of	   the	  weak	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   the
dominaNon	   of	   'clan	   culture'.	   As	   one	   respondent	   said:	   "domes1c	   contractors	   some1mes
referred	  their	  disputes	  to	  Yasser	  Arafat,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Pales1nian	  Libera1on	  Organisa1on
and	  the	  President	  of	   the	  Pales1nian	  Na1onal	  Authority	  who	  told	   them	   'ain't	  you	  willing	   to
give	  something	  back	  to	  Pales1ne?'".
Nonetheless,	  the	  respondents	  stated	  that	  a	  handful	  of	  construcNon	  arbitraNons	  took	  place
in	   the	   nineNes.	   In	   the	   few	   cases	   processed	   by	   tribunals	   normally	   appointed	   by	   the
AssociaNon	   of	   Engineers,	   arbitraNon	   proceedings	   were	   neither	   formal	   nor	   procedurally
robust.	  In	  other	  words,	  arbitrators	  were	  not	  concerned	  and	  the	  parNes	  to	  the	  dispute	  were
not	   cauNous	   about	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   proceedings	   that	   seemed	   to	   have	   a	   "mine"	   of
procedural	   or	   substanNve	   legal	   errors.	   These	   errors	   were	   a	   normal	   outcome	   of	   the
arbitrator’s	   lack	   of	   legal	   or	   professional	   training	   and	   would	   have	   been	   the	   basis	   for
annulment	   of	   an	   award.	   	   Such	   a	   request	   to	   set	   aside	   an	   award	   probably	   appeared	   to	   be
challenging	  to	  the	  judge	  in	  certain	  cases.	  This	  diﬃculty	  led	  to	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  machinery
for	  arbitral	  award	  conﬁrmaNon	  or	  annulment.	  The	  evidence	  available	  on	  this	  breakdown	  is
overwhelming.	  The	  researcher’	  review	  of	  court	  cases	  relevant	  to	  request	  to	  conﬁrm	  or	  set
aside	   arbitral	   awards	   reveals	   inNmidaNng	   ﬁndings.	   While	   the	   average	   duraNon	   of	   courts
proceedings	  to	  conﬁrm	  or	  set	  aside	  commercial	  arbitraNon	  awards	  was	  found	  to	  be	  just	  over
7	  years,	  the	  duraNon	  ranged	  from	  three	  years	  up	  to	  a	  staggering	  twelve	  years.
The	   examinaNon	  of	   all	   available	   court	   cases	   related	   to	   arbitraNon	   awards	   conﬁrmaNon	  or
annulment	  reveals	  a	  mysterious	  pa]ern.	  The	  cases	  that	  were	  lodged	  before	  2000	  took	  more
than	  7	  years	  on	  average.	  The	  cases	  that	  were	  lodged	  aier	  2000	  took	  a	  third	  that	  Nme.	  The
reason	  for	   this	  considerable	   improvement	   is	  probably	  the	   legal	   reforms.	  The	  enactment	  of
the	  ArbitraNon	  Act	  (3)-­‐2000	  has	  provided	  judges	  with	  modern	  legislaNon	  that	  facilitates	  the
review	  of	  arbitral	  awards.	  Further,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Civil
and	   Commercial	   Procedure	   Act	   (2)-­‐2001	   brought	   an	   end	   to	   considerably	   long	   court
proceedings.	   The	   old	   procedural	   laws	   generously	   opened	   the	   door	   for	   repeNNve
postponements	  and adjournments	  that	  led	  to	  signiﬁcant	  delays.
Nevertheless,	   the	   current	   rate	   of	   2-­‐3	   years	   needed	   by	   courts	   to	   conﬁrm	   or	   set	   aside	   an
arbitral	  award	  is	  sNll	   long	   and	   defeats	   one	   of	   the	   fundamental	   objecNves	   of	   arbitraNon	   in
providing	   a	   speedy	   dispute	   resoluNon	   method.	   Thus,	   judicial	   reforms	   are	   required	   to
overcome	  this	  problem	  and	  provide	  contractors	  with	  Nmely	  access	  to	  jusNce.
The	  Contractual	  Infrastructure	  for	  Construc&on	  Arbitra&on
The	  pracNce	  of	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  has	  been	  boosted	  by	  the	  general	  acceptance	  of	  the
main	  employers	  to	  refer	  disputes	  to	  arbitraNon.	  This	  general	  acceptance	  is	  evident	  from	  the
incorporaNon	   of	   arbitraNon	   clauses	   in	   their	   standard	   forms	   of	   construcNon	   contracts.
However,	  the	  impression	  that	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  is	  truly	  and	  genuinely	  accepted	  may
be	  misleading.	  To	  know	  whether	  this	  acceptance	   is	  a	  myth	  or	   reality,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  dig
deep	   beneath	   the	  wording	   of	   arbitraNon	   clauses	   and	   the	   data	   available	   on	   the	   repeNNve
users	  of	   arbitraNon.	  A	   criNcal	   examinaNon	   of	   both	   reveals	   a	   subtle	   division	   between	   two
However,	  the	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  that	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  is	  truly	  and	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  accepted	  may
be	  misleading.	  To	  know	  whether	  this	  acceptance	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  or	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  dig
deep	   beneath	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The	  ﬁrst	  group	  is	  comprised	  of	  employers	  who	  explicitly	  accept	  the	  seat	  of	  arbitraNon	  to	  be
in	   PalesNne.	   They	   also	   normally	   accept	   the	   PalesNnian	   law	   as	   the	   governing	   law	   of	   the
contract	   and	   require	   arbitraNon	   proceedings	   to	   be	   conducted	   at	   EAC,	   AOE	   or	   PIAC.	   A
common	   thread	   between	   those	   employers	   is	   their	   acceptance	   of	   the	   PalesNnian	   Uniﬁed
Contract	  to	  govern	  their	  projects.	  Employers	  in	  this	  group	  include	  governmental	  enNNes	  (e.g.
ministries,	   municipaliNes and	   water	   authoriNes),	   non-­‐governmental	   enNNes	   or
governmental	   development	   agencies	   (e.g.	  Qatar’s	   Gaza	   Re-­‐construcNon	   Commi]ee,	  Qatar
Red	  Crescent,	  etc.)	  and	  private	  enterprises	  (e.g.	  Bank	  of	  PalesNne).	  However,	  there	  are	  some
variances	  in	  this	  group.	  For	   instance,	  American	  Near	  East	  Refugee	  Aid	  (ANERA)	  has	   its	  own
standard	  form	  of	  contract	  but	   it	  requires	  that	  arbitraNon	  shall	  be	  conducted	  in	  accordance
with	   the	   arbitraNon	   procedure	   of	   the	   AssociaNon	   of	   Engineers	   in	   Jerusalem,	   and	   in
accordance	  to	  the	  PalesNnian	  ArbitraNon	  Law.	  Tracing	  informaNon	  on	  the	  repeNNve	  users	  of
construcNon	  arbitraNon,	  from	  interviews	  and	  an	  arbitraNon	  insNtuNon's	  records,	  reveals	  that
governmental	   employers	   are	   the	   busiest	   parNcipants.	   Usually,	   general/main	   contractors
iniNate	   arbitraNon	   proceedings	   against	   governmental	   employers.	   To	   a	   lesser	   extent,	  some
arbitraNon	   cases	   took	   place	   between	   employers	   and	   their	   agents	   (consultants,
designers/architects	  or	  supervisors/engineers).	  	  
The	   second	   group	   is	   comprised	   of	   internaNonal	   employers	   who	   have	   diverse	   dispute
resoluNon	   policies	   as	   regards	   the	   seat	   of	   arbitraNon	   and	   the	   applicable	   rules	   and	   laws	   to
arbitraNon.
The	  InternaNonal	  Commi]ee	  of	   the	  Red	  Cross	   (ICRC)	   	   standard	   form	  of	  contract	  sNpulates
that	   the	   chamber	  of	   commerce	  and	   industry	  of	  Geneva	   shall	   be	   the	   appoinNng	  authority,
UNCITRAL	  rules	  to	  govern	  the	  arbitraNon	  procedure,	  and	  Swiss	  law	  to	  govern	  the	  contract,
the	  arbitraNon	  clause,	  and	  the	  arbitraNon	  procedure.	  This	  probably	  implies	  that	  the	  seat	  of
arbitraNon	  will	  be	  Geneva	  as	  well.
The	  United	  NaNons	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  United	  NaNons	  Development	  Programme	  (UNDP),
the	   United	   NaNons	   InternaNonal	   Children's	   Emergency	   Fund	   (UNICEF)	   and	   the	   Food	   and
Agriculture	  OrganisaNon	  (FAO)	  sNpulate	  UNCITRAL	  rules	  to	  govern	  the	  arbitraNon	  procedure,
but	  are	   silent	  on	   the	   seat	  or	  arbitraNon	   law.	  The	  United	  NaNons	  Relief	  and	  Works	  Agency
(UNRWA)	  standard	  form	  of	  contract,	  that	  is	  silent	  on	  the	  seat	  of	  arbitraNon,	  sNpulates	  that
an	   arbitrator	   shall	   be	   appointed	   jointly	   by	   the	   parNes	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   Permanent
Court	  of	  ArbitraNon	  OpNonal	  Rules	  for	  ArbitraNon	  between	  InternaNonal	  OrganisaNons	  and
Private	   ParNes.	   In	   case	   the	   parNes	   fail	   to	   agree,	   the	   Appointment	   shall	   be	   made	   by	   the
President	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   ArbitraNon	   of	   the	   InternaNonal	   Chamber	   of	   Commerce	   upon
request	  of	   either	  party.	  What	   is	  worth	  menNoning	   is	   that	  UNRWA	  appears	   to	  be	   the	  only
employer	  who	  does	  not	  specify	  a	  naNonal	  law	  as	  the	  substanNve	  law	  governing	  the	  contract.
Instead,	   it	   sNpulates	   “Any	   dispute	   shall	   be	   decided	   according	   to	   the	   provisions	   of	   this
Contract.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   these	   provisions	   do	   not	   fully	   cover	   the	   par1cular	   ma>er	   in
dispute	   recourse	  may	  be	  had	   to	   the	  general	  principles	  of	  commercial	   law	  and	   the	  Lex	  Loci
Contractus	  shall	  only	  aﬀord	  evidence	  of	  such	  general	  principles”.
The	  dispute	  resoluNon	  policies	  of	  major	  lenders	  and	  ﬁnanciers	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  and
the	   European	   Commission,	   the	   Agence	   Française	   de	   Développement	   (AFD)	   and	   the
Kreditanstalt	   für	  Wiederauwau	   (KfW)	   appear	   to	   be	   diverse.	   However,	   generally	   speaking,
they	  have	  a	   tendency	   to	   sNpulate	  InternaNonal	   Chamber	   of	   Commerce	  (ICC)	   internaNonal
arbitraNon	  or	  UNCITRAL	   internaNonal	   arbitraNon	   for	   larger	   contracts	   that	   are	   likely	   to	   be
awarded	   to	   internaNonal	   contractors	   and	   procured	   through	   an	   internaNonal	   compeNNve
bidding	   procedure.	   Likewise,	   they	   have	   a	   tendency	   to	   accept	   arbitraNon	   conducted	   in
PalesNne	   for	   smaller	   contracts.	   For	   instance,	   in	   a	   construcNon	   contract	   ﬁnanced	   by	   the
World	  Bank,	  the	  arbitraNon	  clause	  sNpulated	  ICC	  arbitraNon	  with	  the	  seat	  of	  arbitraNon	  to
be	  Paris,	  but	  the	  PalesNnian	  law	  as	  the	  substanNve	  law.	  This	  large	  infrastructure	  project	  (>$
10M)	  was	  procured	  through	  InternaNonal	  CompeNNve	  Bidding	  procedure	  but	  awarded	  to	  a
local	   contractor.	   In	   a	   construcNon	   contract	   ﬁnanced	   by	   the	   AFD,	   the	   arbitraNon	   clause
sNpulated	  the	  seat	  of	  arbitraNon	  to	  be	  in	  a	  neutral	  place	  and	  the	  governing	  law	  to	  be	  the	  law
of	  PalesNne.	  This	   large	   infrastructure	  project	   (>$	  20M)	  was	  procured	  through	  InternaNonal
CompeNNve	   Bidding	   procedure	   and	   awarded	   to	   a	   joint	   venture	   between	   an	   internaNonal
contractor	  and	  a	  local	  contractor.	  In	  another	  construcNon	  contract	  ﬁnanced	  by	  the	  European
Commission,	  the	  arbitraNon	  clause	  sNpulated	  the	  seat	  of	  arbitraNon	  to	  be	  in	  PalesNne	  and
the	   arbitraNon	   rules	   to	   be	   in	   accordance	   to	   the	   PalesNnian	   arbitraNon	   law.	   This	   large
infrastructure	  project	  (>$	  15M)	  was	  procured	  through	  a	  decentralised	  management	  scheme
Commission,	  the	  arbitraNon	  clause	  sNpulated	  the	  seat	  of	  arbitraNon	  to	  be	  in	  PalesNne	  and
the	   arbitraNon	   rules	   to	   be	   in	   accordance	   to	   the	   PalesNnian	   arbitraNon	   law.	   This	   large
infrastructure	  project	  (>$	  15M)	  was	  procured	  through	  a	  decentralised	  management	  scheme
but	  awarded	  to	  a	   joint	  venture	  between	  an	  internaNonal	  contractor	  and	  a	   local	  contractor.
The	  arbitraNon	  clause	  in	  KFW-­‐	  ﬁnanced	  small	  construcNon	  contracts	  requires	  that	  arbitraNon
is	  to	  be	  conducted	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  PalesNnian	  ArbitraNon	  Law.
 
This	   sample	  of	   arbitraNon	   clauses	   in	   standard	   forms	  of	   contract	   of	   the	  main	   internaNonal
organisaNons	  shows	  that	  they	  may	  or	  may	  not	  expressly	  designate	  an	  arbitraNon	  seat	   in	  the
arbitraNon	  clause.	   If	  silent,	   the	   decision	   as	   to	   the	   seat	   of	   arbitraNon	  will	   be	  made	   by	   the
arbitral	  tribunal,	  in	  accordance	  to	  the	  arbitraNon	  rules	  or	  to	  the	  arbitraNon	  law	  as	  speciﬁed
in	   the	   arbitraNon	   clause.	   The	  interview	  data	   shows	   that	   the	   parNcipaNon	   of	   internaNonal
governmental	  organisaNons	  or	  internaNonal	  agencies	  in	  arbitraNon	  conducted	  in	  PalesNne	  is
almost	   invisible.	   The	   quesNon	   that	   naturally	   arises	   now	   is	  why	   internaNonal	   organisaNons
are	  'reluctant'	  to	  accept	  internaNonal	  arbitraNon	  with	  a	  seat	  in	  PalesNne?
 
The	  Dilemma	  of	  the	  Seat
 
InternaNonal	  organisaNons,	  as	  some	  interviewees	  stated,	  tend	  to	  be	  keener	  to	  parNcipate	  in
an	   amicable	   se]lement	   procedure	   such	   as	   negoNaNon,	   mediaNon	   or	   conciliaNon.	   If	   the
parNes	   fail	   to	   amicably	   se]le	   the	   dispute,	   then	   they	   have	   to	   seek	   a	   binding	   and	   ﬁnal
decision.	   The	   most	   typical	   venue	   to	   obtain	   such	   a	   decision	   is	   liNgaNon	   or	   arbitraNon.
However,	   private	   contractors	   cannot	   bring	   internaNonal	   organisaNons	   to	   naNonal	   courts.
This	   is	  because	   the	   internaNonal	  organisaNons	  enjoy	  an	   immunity	   from	   the	   jurisdicNon	  of
domesNc	   courts.	   Individuals	   and	  private	  enNNes	  have	   tried	  and	   failed	   to	   commence	   court
proceedings	   against	   internaNonal	   organisaNons.	   For	   instance,	   Al-­‐Dar	   PalesNnian	   Company
for	  ConstrucNon	  and	  ReconstrucNon	   failed	   to	   iniNate	  court	  proceedings	  against	   the	  UNDP.
On	   another	   case,	   the	   court	   declared	   that	   UNRWA	   is	   an	   internaNonal	   organisaNon	   and
therefore	  enjoys	  immunity	  against	  judicial	  prosecuNon.	  If	  internaNonal	  organisaNons	  	  do	  not
provide	   for	   alternaNve	  mechanisms	   to	   se]le	   disputes,	   private	   companies	  would	   not	   have
any	   access	   to	   jusNce.	   From	   this	   dilemma	   a	   duty	   arises	   on	   the	   part	   of	   internaNonal
organisaNons	   to	   provide	   for	   alternaNve	   means	   of	   dispute	   resoluNon	   including	   arbitraNon
when	  they	  rely	  on	  their	  immuniNes	  (Wickremasinghe,	  2003).
However,	   although	   internaNonal	   organisaNons	   accept	   recourse	   to	   arbitraNon,	   they	   oien
tend	  to	  be	   reluctant	   to	  accept	   the	   seat	   to	  be	   in	  PalesNne.	   In	   internaNonal	  arbitraNon,	   the
‘seat’	  or	  ‘place’	  of	  arbitraNon	  is	  important	  because	  its	   law	  governs	  and	  its	  courts	  supervise
the	   arbitraNon	   proceedings.	   The	   procedural	   law	   of	   the	   seat	   provides	   the	   mandatory
procedural	   rules	   that	   govern	   the	  arbitraNon	  proceedings.	   In	   addiNon,	   it	   aﬀects	  procedural
aspects	  such	  as	  the	  power	  of	  the	  arbitral	  tribunal,	  the	  quality	  of	  state	  court	  intervenNon	  in
the	   arbitral	   proceedings	   and	   the	   conﬁrmaNon	   and	   the	   enforceability	   of	   the	   arbitrators’
award	   (Webster	   and	   Buhler,	   2014).	   Whereas	   the	   PalesNnian	   ArbitraNon	   Act	   2000	   is	   a
modern	  act	  draied	  in	  accordance	  to	  UNCITRAL	  Model	  Law,	  internaNonal	  organisaNons	  may
have	   some	   concerns	   about	   the	   quality	   of	   interference	   or	   intervenNon	   of	   the	   PalesNnian
courts.	   An	   arbitrator,	  who	   has	   long	   experience	   in	   one	   of	   the	  UN	   agencies,	   a]ributed	   this
concern	  to	  the	  perceived	  "linkage"	  between	  arbitraNon	  and	  the	  naNonal	  court	  in	  procedural
ma]ers	   (and	   more	   importantly	   in	   sezng	   aside	   or	   annulling	   arbitral	   awards)	   and
enforcement	  ma]ers.	  Some	  internaNonal	  organisaNons,	  because	  of	  a	  broad	  interpretaNon	  of
the	   extent	   of	   their	   immuniNes,	  may	  not	  wish	   to	  be	   subject	   to	   the	   jurisdicNon	   of	   naNonal
courts	  in	  ma]ers	  related	  to	  arbitraNon	  proceedings	  or	  enforcement	  of	  award.	  In	  this	  sense,
they	   perceive	   arbitraNon	   as	   a	   backdoor	   to	   naNonal	   liNgaNon.	   However,	   the	   immunity
defence	  is	  very	  problemaNc	  here	  because	  it	  will	  not	  be	  limited	  to	  domesNc	  courts	  but	  it	  will
extend	  to	  all	  courts	  around	  the	  world.	  This	  may	  result	  in	  abuse	  of	  privileges	  and	  immuniNes
in	  bad	  faith.	  This	  raises	  more	  serious	  and	  fundamental	  quesNons	  on	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the
internaNonal	  organisaNons	  in	  providing	  private	  parNes	  with	  means	  to	  have	  access	  to	  jusNce.
Hence,	   assuming	   that	   interna0onal	   organisa0on	  will	   undergo	   arbitra0on	   in	   good	   faith,	   then	   their
concerns	   in	   accep0ng	   the	   seat	   of	   arbitra0on	   to	   be	   in	   Pales0ne	   will	   probably	   be	   related	   to	   the
neutrality	  and	  competence	  of	  the	  Pales0nian	  courts.
Further,	  some	  interviewees	  quesNoned	  the	  willingness	  of	  some	  internaNonal	  organisaNons
to	   provide	   pla{orms	   that	   will	   redress	   the	   inherent	   imbalance	   of	   power	   between	   the
contracNng	  parNes	  (opportunism).	  An	  acceptance	  to	  refer	  disputes	  to	  arbitraNon	  conducted
in	  PalesNne	  might	  place	  them	  on	  equal	   fooNng	  with	  domesNc	  contractors.	  Contractors	  will
be	  more	  capable,	  technically	  and	  ﬁnancially,	  to	  commence	  arbitraNon	  proceedings	  at	  home
than	  abroad.	  InternaNonal	  organisaNons	  perhaps	  want	  to	  avoid	  this.	  They	  want	  to	  maintain
in	  PalesNne	  might	  place	  them	  on	  equal	   fooNng	  with	  domesNc	  contractors.	  Contractors	  will
be	  more	  capable,	  technically	  and	  ﬁnancially,	  to	  commence	  arbitraNon	  proceedings	  at	  home
than	  abroad.	  InternaNonal	  organisaNons	  perhaps	  want	  to	  avoid	  this.	  They	  want	  to	  maintain
the	  upper	  hand	   in	  negoNaNons	   through	  providing	   for	  oﬀshore	   internaNonal	  arbitraNon.	   In
the	   words	   of	   a	   contractor-­‐arbitrator,	   "this	   contractual	   machinery	  means	   contractors	   who
have	  legi1mate	  rights	  will	  spend	  the	  awarded	  money	  on	  ﬂights,	  hotels,	  and	  travel	  expenses
and	  will	  pay	  for	  the	  arbitra1on	  costs	  from	  their	  own	  pocket.	  They	  be>er	  not	  to	  do	  so".	  This
rule	  of	  the	  game	  leaves	  the	  majority	  of	  contractors	  with	  one	  course	  of	  acNon;	  to	  accept	  the
outcome	  of	  negoNaNon	  no	  ma]er	  how	  unfair	  it	  can	  be.
Overall,	   this	  situaNon	  raises	   legiNmate	  and	  fundamental	  quesNons	  on	  the	  adequacy	  of	  the
mechanism	  internaNonal	  organisaNons	  put	  in	  place	  to	  deal	  with	  claims	  against	  them	  and	  on
their	  commitment	  to	  facilitate	  the	  proper	  administraNon	  of	   jusNce.	  There	  is	  a	  real	  concern
that	  what	  they	  provide	  for	   in	  their	  contracts	   is	  no	  more	  than	  a	  dubious	  move	  to	  discharge
their	   duty	   to	   provide	   'appropriate'	   alternaNve	  means	   to	   resolve	   disputes	   in	   light	   of	   their
immunity	   from	   the	   jurisdicNon	   of	   domesNc	   courts.	   This	   is	   a	   real	   problem	   because	   it	  may
amount	  to	  'denial	  to	  jusNce'.
To	  overcome	  this	  problem,	  there	  are	  three	  conceivable	  soluNons	  for	  ensuring	  an	  aﬀordable
access	  to	  jusNce.	  These	  soluNons	  may	  accommodate	  any	  genuine	  concern	  the	  internaNonal
organisaNons	  may	  have	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  neutrality	  of	  the	  seat	  of	  arbitraNon	  and	  the	  quality
of	  its	  courts	  intervenNons.
First,	   internaNonal	   organisaNons	   may	   keep	   the	   seat	   of	   arbitraNon	   in	   a	   neutral	   place	   but
physically	  conduct	  arbitraNon	  in	  PalesNne.	  This	  is	  possible	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  concept	  that	  that
the	   juridical	   'seat'	   of	   arbitraNon	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   'venue'	   where	   hearings	   or	   other
proceedings	  physically	  take	  place	  (Webster	  and	  Buhler,	  2014).	  When	  internaNonal	  employers
dictate	   that	   the	   proceedings	   are	   to	   take	   place	   at	   a	   locaNon	  distant	   from	   the	   construcNon
project,	  great	  inconvenience	  may	  result	  to	  the	  parNes,	  witnesses,	  and	  arbitrators.	  Hence,	  the
juridical	   seat	   of	   arbitraNon	   can	   be	   London	   or	   Paris	   but	   the	   arbitraNon	   can	   be	   physically
conducted	   in	   Jerusalem,	  Ramallah	  or	  Gaza,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   locaNons	  of	  witnesses
and	  evidence,	  the	  needs	  and	  convenience	  of	  the	  parNes,	  the	  availability	  of	  hearing	  faciliNes
and	  relaNve	  costs	  associated	  with	  transportaNon	  and	  accommodaNon.	  Second,	   they	  might
also	  specify	  in	  the	  arbitraNon	  clause	  that	  the	  seat	  of	  arbitraNon	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  amount
in	   dispute.	   So,	   if	   the	   amount	   is	   less	   than	   let’s	   say	   $1,000,000	   then	   the	   seat	   is	   to	   be	   in
PalesNne.	  Otherwise,	   it	  will	   be	   somewhere	   else.	   	   Third,	   referring	   construcNon	  disputes	   to
regional	   arbitraNon	   centres	   may	   address	   contractors'	   interest	   in	   'aﬀordability'	   and
internaNonal	  organisaNons'	   interest	   in	   'neutrality'.	   In	  parNcular,	   selecNng	  Cairo	  as	   the	   seat
and/or	  the	  venue	  to	  physically	  conduct	  arbitraNon	  has	  a	  considerable	  weight	  because	  of	  two
main	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   the	   EgypNan	   jurisdicNon	  has	   a	  well-­‐developed	   arbitraNon	   law	   and	   a
judiciary	   that	   is	   familiar	   with	   internaNonal	   arbitraNon.	   Egypt	   has	   a	   well-­‐developed
jurisprudence	  of	  internaNonal	  commercial	  arbitraNon	  and	  the	  state	  courts	  have	  experience
in	  applying	  the	  jurisdicNon’s	   internaNonal	  arbitraNon	  laws.	  Secondly,	  the	  physical	  proximity
of	  Cairo,	  as	  the	  arbitral	  seat,	  to	  the	  place	  of	  projects	  performed	  in	  PalesNne	  is	  an	  important
element	  to	  ensure	  an	  aﬀordable	  and	  convenient	  venue.
Arbitra&on	  is	  Adversarial	  and	  Confronta&onal
The	   provision	   of	   legal,	   contractual	   and	   insNtuNonal	   infrastructure	   for	   arbitraNon	   has
signiﬁcantly	   increased	   its	   popularity.	   However,	   contractors	   a]empt	   to	   avoid	   this	   venue
because	   it	   is	  perceived	  as	  an	  adversarial	  process	   that	  may	   lead	   to	   negaNve	   consequences
spanning	  beyond	  the	  current	  project.	   Some	  employers	  will	  probably	  designate	  contractors
seeking	  arbitraNon	  as	  confrontaNonal	  and	  ‘claim-­‐oriented’	  and	  hence	  not	  consider	  their	  bids
in	  future	  projects.	  Two	  parNcipants	  conﬁrmed	  that	  a	  large	  employer	  has	  ‘blacklisted’	  a	  large
contractor	   by	   excluding	   its	   bids	   because	   it	   considered	   arbitraNon	   to	   resolve	   their
controversies.	   In	   fact,	   in	   the	   pre-­‐qualiﬁcaNon	   stage,	   some	   employers	   request	   bidders	   to
declare	  accurate	  informaNon	  about	  any	  liNgaNon	  or	  arbitraNon	  arising	  out	  of	  contracts	  they
performed	  in	  the	  last	  ﬁve	  years.	  The	  arbitraNon	  record	  may	  aﬀect	  the	  technical	  evaluaNon	  of
bidders.	  Some	  employers,	  state	  in	  their	  standard	  forms	  that	  "A	  consistent	  history	  of	  liNgaNon
or	  arbitraNon	  awards	  against	  the	  Applicant	  or	  any	  partner	  of	  a	  Joint	  Venture	  may	  result	   in
disqualiﬁcaNon".
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  some	  interviewees	  state	  that	  employers,	  if	  they	  are	  the	  party	  in	  default,
may	  be	  blamed	  by	  donors	  for	  mismanagement	  that	  results	  in	  ineﬃcient	  spending	  of	  money
and	   therefore	   they	   may	   rethink	   funding	   future	   projects	   or	   programmes.	   Yet,	   employers
could	   be	   interested	   in	   arbitraNon	   as	   a	   credible	   way	   to	   jusNfy	   addiNonal	   payments	   for
contractors	  to	  donors.
Arbitra&on	  is	  Expensive
As	   most	   arbitrators	   aﬃrmed,	   insNtuNonal	   arbitraNon	   tends	   to	   be	   more	   expensive	   than
liNgaNon.	   The	   reasons	   for	   this	   percepNon,	   in	   the	   authors'	   opinion,	   can	   be	   related	   to	   the
contractors	  to	  donors.
Arbitra&on	  is	  Expensive
As	   most	   arbitrators	   aﬃrmed,	   insNtuNonal	   arbitraNon	   tends	   to	   be	   more	   expensive	   than
liNgaNon.	   The	   reasons	   for	   this	   percepNon,	   in	   the	   authors'	   opinion,	   can	   be	   related	   to	   the
mechanism	   for	   determining	   the	   arbitraNon	   fees,	   the	   disputants'	   opportunism,	   and	   the
tribunal's	  lack	  of	  exercise	  of	  its	  power	  to	  decide	  on	  arbitraNon	  cost.
The	   authors	   examined	   the	   rules	   of	   two	   arbitral	   insNtuNons	   (EAC,	   PIAC)	   as	   regards
determining	  the	  arbitraNon	  fees.	  ArbitraNon	  fees	  diﬀer	  according	  to	  the	  arbitral	   insNtuNon
and	   the	   value	   of	   a	   dispute.	   In	   PalesNne,	   the	   arbitral	   insNtuNons	   ﬁx	   the	   arbitraNon	   fees
(arbitrators'	   fees	   and	   administraNve	   fees)	   according	   to	   a	   sliding	   scale	   determined	   by	   the
value	  of	  a	  dispute,	  which	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  claims	  ﬁled	  by	  all	  parNes.	  For	  disputes	  that	  have
values	   less	   than	   $500,000	   -­‐	   which	   is	   most	   disputes	   in	   accordance	   to	   EAC	   administraNve
arbitraNon	  report	  (2011-­‐2014)	  -­‐,	  the	  arbitraNon	  fees	  start	  from	  around	  10%	  (for	  small-­‐value
disputes)	   and	   goes	   down	   to	   slightly	   more	   than	   1%	   (for	   large-­‐value	   disputes).	   By	   simply
comparing	  this	  to	  the	  court	  fees	  (normally	  1%	  of	  the	  value	  of	  a	  dispute	  but	  not	  more	  than
JOD	  500),	  it	  becomes	  evident	  that	  arbitraNon	  is	  more	  expensive	  than	  court	  liNgaNon.
However,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  simple	  comparison	  excludes	  liNgaNon/arbitraNon
associated	   costs	   such	  as	   legal	   counsels	   and	  advocates,	   expert	  witnesses	  etc.	   For	   instance,
arbitraNon	   might	   save	   costs	   because	   the	   parNes	   may	   not	   need	   legal	   representaNon	   and
because	  the	  parNes	  may	  not	  need	  to	  hire	  experts	  on	  issue	  related	  to	  delay,	  quantum,	  defects
etc.	  as	  the	  tribunal	  is	  normally	  composed	  of	  arbitrators	  experienced	  in	  the	  engineering	  and
construcNon	  ma]ers.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Nme	  value	  of	  money	  as	  manifested	  in	  a	  quick
and	   ﬁnal	   arbitral	   decision	   -­‐	   that	   is	   one	   of	   the	   typical	   advantages	   of	   arbitraNon	   when
compared	  to	  the	  three	  levels	  of	  liNgaNon	  -­‐	  is	  quesNonable	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  the	  current
enforcement	  Nme	  of	  arbitral	   awards	   in	  PalesNne	   is	   lengthy.	   Second,	   if	   an	  arbitral	   award	   is
annulled	  or	  set	  aside,	  this	  pracNcally	  means	  the	  enNre	  arbitraNon	  procedure	  was	  a	  waste	  of
Nme	  and	  money.	  	  Because	  of	  these	  reasons,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  it	  is	  diﬃcult
to	  ﬁrmly	  conclude	  whether	  arbitraNon	  or	  liNgaNon	  is	  more	  expensive.
Further,	   the	   authors	   examined	   informaNon	   available	   on	   30	   construcNon	   arbitraNon	   cases
processed	  by	  an	  arbitral	   insNtuNon.	  The	  value	  of	  claims	   in	  arbitraNon	  requests	   range	   from
$7,500	  to	  $850,000	  and	  the	  value	  of	  counterclaims	  range	  from	  $0	  to	  $2,370,000.	  The	  largest
arbitraNon	  case	  referred	  to	  this	  insNtuNon	  has	  a	  total	  value	  of	  claims	  and	  counterclaims	  of
around	  $2,760,000.	  Yet,	  the	  largest	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  case	  conducted	  in	  PalesNne	  had
a	  total	  value	  of	  $4,000,000	  according	  to	  two	  interviewees.	  The	  examinaNon	  of	  the	  values	  of
claims,	   counterclaims	   and	   awards	   in	   some	   of	   these	   cases	   shows	   that	   contractors	   oien
exaggerate	  the	  amounts	  of	  claims,	  and	  the	  employers	  someNmes	  respond	  with	   inﬂated	  or
pseudo	  counterclaims	  in	  a	  gesture	  of	  reciprocal	  opportunism.	  Almost	  half	  of	  the	  defendants
retaliated	  by	  counterclaims	  that	  are,	  in	  many	  cases,	  greater	  than	  the	  value	  of	  the	  claimant’s
claims.	  Inevitably,	  this	  behaviour	  means	  higher	  arbitraNon	  fees	  for	  both	  parNes	  because	  the
arbitraNon	   centres	   	   do	   not	   charge	   the	   fees	   based	   on	   the	   Nme	   spent	   but	   based	   on	   the
amount	   in	  dispute,	   that	   is	   oien	  massively	   larger	   than	   the	   awarded	   amounts.	   It	   is	   worth
menNoning	  that	  the	  current	  system	  for	  determining	  arbitraNon	  fees	  based	  on	  the	  amount	  in
dispute	   should	   in	   theory	   provide	   incenNve	   for	   disputants	   to	   be	   realisNc	   in	   their
claim/counterclaim	  values.	  However,	  for	  some	  reason,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  successful	  in	  pracNce
and	  hence	  a	  remedial	  acNon	  by	  arbitral	  tribunals	  is	  necessary.
Nonetheless,	   such	   a	   remedial	   acNon	   to	   address	   disputants'	   opportunism	   appears	   to	   have
escaped	  the	  control	  of	  the	  tribunal.	  The	  ArbitraNon	  Act	  allows	  the	  parNes	   to	  agree	  on	  the
cost	   allocaNon	   in	   arbitraNon.	   If	   the	   parNes	   have	   not	   agreed,	   the	   arbitral	   tribunal	   has	   the
power	  to	  determine	  the	  allocaNon	  of	  costs	  and	  the	  party	  liable	  for	  such	  costs	  but	  must	  state
the	  grounds	  or	  reasons	  for	  this	  decision.	  Typically,	  the	  cost	  are	  seen	  to	  follow	  the	  event	  (i.e.
loser	  pays	  rule)	  and	   it	   includes	  the	  fees	  of	   the	  arbitral	   tribunal,	   fees	   for	   the	  administraNve
insNtuNon,	   and	   all	   other	   costs	   reasonably	   incurred	   by	   the	   parNes	   including	   legal	   counsels
and	  advocates	  and	  expert	  witnesses.	  Although	  the	  ArbitraNon	  Act	  empowers	  the	  tribunal	  to
award	  arbitraNon	  costs	  against	  a	  losing	  party,	  which	  means	  the	  winner	  may	  become	  enNtled
to	   recover	   its	   expenses,	   this	   authority	   is	   rarely	   exercised.	   	   The	   common	   pracNce,	   as	   the
interviewees	  aﬃrmed,	   is	  that	  the	  parNes	   to	   the	  dispute	  share	   the	  arbitraNon	   fees	  equally,
and	  bear	   their	  own	  expenses.	  Nonetheless,	   there	  are	   few	  cases	   in	  which	  arbitral	   tribunals
have	   included	   in	   their	   awards	   decisions	   on	   the	   apporNonment	   of	   arbitraNon	   costs	   (that
include	  the	  arbitraNon	  fees	  and	  the	  reasonable	  expenses	  incurred	  by	  the	  winner	  in	  pursuing
its	  claim	  or	  defence).
Overall,	   the	   current	   approach	   in	   the	   allocaNon	   of	   arbitraNon	   cost	   is	   problemaNc	   for	   the
whole	   arbitraNon	   community.	   It	   fails	   to	   make	   disputants	   'realisNc'	   in	   their
claim/counterclaim	   values	   which	   escalates	   the	   cost	   of	   arbitraNon.	   Also,	   it	   fails	   to	   stop
'guerrilla	   tacNcs'	   that	   prolong	   arbitraNon	   procedures.	   Lengthy	   arbitraNon	   does	   not	   only
Overall,	   the	   current	   approach	   in	   the	   allocaNon	   of	   arbitraNon	   cost	   is	   problemaNc	   for	   the
whole	   arbitraNon	   community.	   It	   fails	   to	   make	   disputants	   'realisNc'	   in	   their
claim/counterclaim	   values	   which	   escalates	   the	   cost	   of	   arbitraNon.	   Also,	   it	   fails	   to	   stop
'guerrilla	   tacNcs'	   that	   prolong	   arbitraNon	   procedures.	   Lengthy	   arbitraNon	   does	   not	   only
mean	  a	  'delayed	  jusNce'	  for	  the	  disputants	  but	  it	  also	  results	  in	  'unworthy	  job'	  for	  arbitrators.
Arbitrators	  may	  have	   to	  work	  much	   longer	  hours	   than	  anNcipated	   leading	   to	   'inadequate'
ﬁnancial	  return	  from	  arbitraNon	  appointments.	  This	  dissaNsfacNon,	  as	  one	  arbitrator	  stated,
also	  stems	  from	  the	  pracNce	  of	  an	  arbitral	   insNtuNon	   (EAC)	   to	  automaNcally	  appoint	   three
arbitrators	  no	  ma]er	  how	  small	  a	  dispute	  might	  be.	  The	  degradaNon	  of	  arbitraNon	  eﬃciency
will	  probably	  reduce	  its	  a]racNveness	  for	  disputants	  and	  arbitrators.
Hence,	   managing	   the	   costs	   of	   arbitraNon	   is	   necessary	   in	   the	   light	   of	   this	   criNcism.	   The
management	  of	  arbitraNon	  costs	  has	  two	  components.
The	   ﬁrst	   component,	   at	   the	   commencement	   of	   arbitraNon,	   is	   about	   determining	   the
arbitraNon	  fees.	  There	  are	  basically	  two	  systems	  to	  determine	  the	  arbitraNon	  fees;	  based	  on
Nme	  spent	  or	  amounts	  in	  dispute.	  The	  Nme-­‐based	  system	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  determining
the	   fees	  based	  on	   the	  actual	  work	  done.	   This	   system	   is	   fair	   from	   the	   arbitrator's	   point	   of
view	   but	   it	   does	   not	   provide	   incenNve	   for	   arbitrators	   to	   be	   eﬃcient.	   Yet,	   the	   system	   is
probably	   able	   to	   correct	   itself	   as	   arbitrators	   sNll	   have	   to	   be	   eﬃcient	   due	   to	   market
compeNNon	  and	  to	  receive	  future	  appointments.	  The	  amount	  in	  dispute-­‐based	  system	  may
be	  unfair	  from	  the	  arbitrator's	  point	  of	  view.	  It	  has;	  however,	  the	  advantage	  of	  transparency
and	   predictability	   of	   the	   overall	   cost	   of	   arbitraNon,	   from	   the	   parNes'	   point	   of	   view.	   It
provides	  incenNve	  for	  arbitrators	  to	  be	  eﬃcient,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  same	  incenNve
for	  disputants	  to	  not	  prolong	  the	  case.	  It	  seems	  that	  both	  systems	  might	  not	  be	  suﬃcient	  to
provide	  incenNve	  for	  the	  parNes	  to	  be	  realisNc	  in	  the	  amount	  they	  claim	  and	  to	  be	  eﬃcient
in	  the	  conduct	  of	  arbitraNon	  at	  the	  same	  Nme.	  Therefore,	  it	  becomes	  necessary	  for	  tribunals
to	  exercise	  their	  power	  to	  control	  arbitraNon	  cost.
The	   second	   component,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   arbitraNon,	   	   is	   the	   allocaNon	   of	   arbitraNon	   cost.
Arbitrators	   should	   exercise	   their	   authority	   to	   make	   an	   award	   allocaNng	   the	   costs	   of	   the
arbitraNon	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   Nme	   spent	   in	   dealing	   with	   unmeritorious	   claims	   or
counterclaims,	  grossly	  exaggerated	  claims,	  unsaNsfactory	  conduct	  by	  a	  party	  in	  the	  course	  of
the	  arbitraNon	  and	  so	  on.	  This	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  process	  that	   is	  fair	  for	  all;	  the	  disputants	  and
the	  arbitrators. 
Users	  of	  Construc&on	  Arbitra&on
Summarising	   the	   current	   state	   of	   aﬀairs,	   a	   contractor-­‐arbitrator	   stated	   “Pales1nian
contractors	   have	   become	   ready	   to	   ﬁght	   only	   recently.	   This	   is	   certainly	   by	   virtue	   of	   the
signiﬁcant	   improvements	   to	   arbitra1on	   infrastructure.	   Before,	   they	   would	   se>le…	   Now
arbitra1on	  is	  well-­‐established	  in	  the	  construc1on	  industry”.
In	   regard	   to	   the	   current	   usage	   of	   arbitraNon,	   the	   researchers	   have	   not	  managed	   to	   ﬁnd
complete	  or	  even	  semi-­‐complete	  data	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  in	  PalesNne.
However,	   the	   researchers	   received	   staNsNcs	   of	   arbitraNon	   cases	   referred	   to	   two	   arbitral
insNtuNons	  that	  a]ract	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  construcNon	  arbitraNon.	  The	  ﬁrst	  (based	  in	  Gaza)
processes	  4	  arbitraNon	  cases	  on	  average	  per	  annum	  while	   the	   second	   (based	   in	   the	  West
Bank)	  processes	  24	  arbitraNon	  cases	  on	  average	  per	  annum.	  This	  evidence	  corroborates	  the
available	  empirical	  evidence	  suggesNng	  that	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  is	  more	  common	  in	  the
West	  Bank	  than	  in	  Gaza	  (Besaiso	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  The	  diﬀerence	  in	  the	  pa]ern	  of	  construcNon
dispute	  resoluNon	  between	  Gaza	  and	  the	  West	  Bank	  can	  be	  a]ributed	  to	  variaNons	  in	  ‘legal
culture’	   and	   the	   percepNon	   of	   arbitraNon,	   the	   size	   of	   construcNon	   business,	   number	   of
projects	   etc.	   The	   number	   of	   internaNonal	   construcNon	   arbitraNon	   cases	   that	   were
conducted	  aboard,	  as	  stated	  by	  most	  respondents,	  are	  a	  handful	  of	  cases.	  	  	  	  Keeping	  in	  mind
the	  small	  size	  of	  the	  construcNon	  industry	  in	  PalesNne	  ~ 	  $	  2.3	  billion	  (Oﬃce	  of	  the	  Quartet
RepresentaNve,	  2014),	  the	  number	  of	  arbitraNon	  cases	  appears	  to	  be	  proporNonally	  high.
Although	   the	   main	   users	   of	   arbitraNon	   are	   governmental	   employers,	   there	   is	   anecdotal
evidence	  that	  two	   internaNonal	  governmental	  organisaNons	  or	   internaNonal	  agencies	  have
recently	   parNcipated	   in	   internaNonal	   arbitraNon	   conducted	   in	   PalesNne.	   This	   may	   be	   a
promising	   start	   to	   bring	   a	   change	   in	   the	   aztude	   and	   dispute	   resoluNon	   policy	   of
internaNonal	   organisaNons.	   Such	   a	   change	   is	   important	   because	   the	   sNpulaNon	   of
internaNonal	  employers	  that	  internaNonal	  arbitraNon	  is	  to	  be	  seated	  abroad	  (e.g.	  in	  Paris	  or
Geneva)	  hinders	  many	  contractors	  from	  seeking	  their	  rights	  as	   the	  majority	  of	   their	  claims
are	  of	   small	  values.	  Contractors	  end	  up	  with	  negoNaNon	  or	  waiving	   their	  claims.	  All	   in	  all,
internaNonal	  employers	  should	  rethink	  their	  policy	  towards	  Nered-­‐dispute	  resoluNon	  clauses
in	   their	   standard	   forms	  of	   contract	  because	   the	   current	   system	  prevents	   contractors	   from
economic	  access	  to	  jusNce.
Conclusion
This	   paper	   is	   a	   Nmely	   contribuNon	   to	   knowledge	   given	   the	   recent	   increasing	   interest	   in
in	   their	   standard	   forms	  of	   contract	  because	   the	   current	   system	  prevents	   contractors	   from
economic	  access	  to	  jusNce.
Conclusion
This	   paper	   is	   a	   Nmely	   contribuNon	   to	   knowledge	   given	   the	   recent	   increasing	   interest	   in
construcNon	  arbitraNon	  in	  PalesNne.	  It	  shows	  that	  arbitraNon	  has	  been	  in	  use	  in	  PalesNne	  for
a	   long	   Nme.	   It	   did	   not	   suddenly	   come	   into	   being	   because	   of	   the	   passage	   of	   a	   modern
arbitraNon	   act	   in	   2000.	   This	   paper	   addresses	   the	   considerable	   changes	   that	   popularised
what	  used	  to	  be	  rare,	  insNtuNonalised	  what	  used	  to	  be	  ad-­‐hoc	  and	  formalised	  what	  used	  to
be	   procedurally	   poor.	   Since	   2000,	   a	   remarkable	   improvement	   to	   construcNon	   arbitraNon
infrastructure	  has	  taken	  place.	  This	  includes	  legislaNve	  reforms	  (e.g.	  ArbitraNon	  Act	  3/2000;
Civil	  and	  Commercial	  Procedure	  Act	  2/2001),	  establishment	  of	  new	  arbitraNon	   insNtuNons
and	  emergence	  of	  qualiﬁed	  construcNon	  arbitrators.
However,	   some	   challenges	   sNll	   hinder	   arbitraNon	   from	   reaching	   its	   full	   potenNal.	   First,
despite	  the	  considerable	  improvements	  in	  the	  legal	  infrastructure,	  the	  current	  Nme	  a	  court
takes	  to	  conﬁrm	  or	  annul	  an	  arbitral	  award	  is	  	  sNll	  long	  enough	  to	  defeat	  the	  very	  purpose	  of
arbitraNon	  in	  providing	  a	  quick	  resoluNon	  to	  disputes.	  Second,	  costly	  arbitraNon	  is	  probably
a	   result	   of	   the disputants’	   opportunism	   in	   grossly	   exaggeraNng	   their	   claims	   and
counterclaims,	  the	  arbitraNon	  insNtuNons'	  mechanism	  in	  determining	  arbitraNon	  fees	  based
on	  the	  sum	  of	  dispute	  which	   is	  oien	   inﬂated,	  and	  the	  arbitrators'	   lack	  of	  exercise	  of	   their
discreNon	   to	  make	   award	   on	   costs	  which	   is	   expected	   to	   restrain	   opportunism	   and	   hence
arbitraNon	  costs.	  	  Third,	  the	  reluctance	  of	  some	  internaNonal	  organisaNons	  to	  parNcipate	  in
arbitraNon	  seated	  in	  PalesNne	  is	  problemaNc.	  If	  they	  wish	  to	  fulﬁl	  their	  development	  goals,
they	  should	  discharge	  their	  duty	  to	  facilitate	  access	  to	  jusNce	  and	  make	  arbitraNon	  work	  for
domesNc	  contractors.	   InternaNonal	  organisaNon	  will	  probably	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  accept	  an
arbitraNon	   seat	   in	   PalesNne in	   light	   of	   PalesNne's	   recent	   raNﬁcaNon	   of	   the	   New	   York
convenNon	  in	  2015	  and	  in	  light	  of	  its	  prospecNve	  arbitraNon	  act.	  The	  raNﬁcaNon	  of	  the	  New
York	   ConvenNon	   assures	   the	   contracNng	   parNes	   that	   the	   PalesNnians'	   courts	   will	   follow
internaNonal	  pracNce	  in	  the	  recogniNon	  and	  enforcement	  of	  arbitral	  awards.	  The	  proposed
changes	  to	  the	  ArbitraNon	  Act	  are	  expected	  to	  detach	  the	  arbitraNon	  process	  more	  from	  the
naNonal	  courts	  and	  hence	  will	  create	  a	  more	  arbitraNon-­‐friendly	  environment.
If	   these	   problems	   linger,	   construcNon	   arbitraNon	   may	   have	   a	   recession.	   The	   users	   may
quesNon	   its	   remaining	   value	   if	   it	   is	   not	   only	   more	   expensive	   but	   also	   takes	   years	   from
commencement	  of	  arbitraNon	  proceedings	  to	  enforcement	  of	  arbitraNon	  awards.	  The	  very
purpose	   of	   arbitraNon	   is	   to	   provide	   a	   relaNvely	   cheap	   and	   quick	   resoluNon	   of	   disputes.
Although	  the	  parNes	  might	  be	  more	  tolerant	  with	  regards	  to	  cost,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  aﬀordable,
they	  might	  not	  have	  the	  same	  tolerance	  towards	  Nme.
Nevertheless,	  on	  balance,	  it	  seems	  arbitraNon	  will	  stay	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  dispute	  resoluNon
techniques.	   This	   is	   not	   because	   arbitraNon	   is	   not	  without	   limitaNons,	   but	   because	   of the
absence	  of	  any	  real	  compeNNon	  from	  any	  other	  dispute	  resoluNon	  mechanism.	  While	  court
liNgaNon	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  hard	  opNon	  to	  swallow,	  adjudicaNon	   is	  considerably	   ignored	  and
almost	  non-­‐existent.	  MediaNon	  or	  conciliaNon	  also	  has	  many	  more	  socio-­‐cultural	  challenges.
Therefore,	  construcNon	  arbitraNon	  is	  expected	  to	  conNnue	  to	  gain	  new	  territories.
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